Funding disturbution in Greece

In the EU migration governance framework, two principal funding instruments are allocated to member states: the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which supports asylum reception, integration, and return policies, and the Internal Security Fund (ISF), primarily directed to border management and internal security and typically channelled to state authorities. In the Greek case, however, this standard funding architecture was substantially reconfigured. On 16 March 2016—two days prior to the EU Turkey Joint Statement—the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) was established to assist Greece in managing approximately 60,000 refugees who remained in the country, marking
the first humanitarian operation ever implemented on EU territory.

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2016-2019


In the EU migration governance framework, two principal funding instruments are allocated to member states: the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which supports asylum reception, integration, and return policies, and the Internal Security Fund (ISF), primarily directed to border management and internal security and typically channelled to state authorities. In the Greek case, however, this standard funding architecture was substantially reconfigured. On 16 March 2016—two days prior to the EU Turkey Joint Statement—the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) was established to assist Greece in managing approximately 60,000 refugees who remained in the country, marking
the first humanitarian operation ever implemented on EU territory
. Administered by DG ECHO, ESI funding was directed exclusively to international actors, namely UN agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), a pattern that was similarly reproduced in the allocation of AMIF resources during the same period.
As illustrated in the diagram, between 2016 and 2019—during the tenure of the Syriza government—approximately €1.3 billion or 87% was allocated to international organisations, while Greek state services and ministries collectively received around €175 million. Most strikingly, the Ministry of Migration, the authority formally responsible for migration governance, received just €3.2 million, just 0.2%, out of the roughly €1.5 billion distributed during this period.
This allocation pattern closely mirrors the governance logic applied during Greece’s financial crisis, when the Greek state was widely portrayed by European institutions as institutionally deficient, marked by weak administrative capacity, clientelism, and corruption, thereby legitimising the transfer of responsibility to external actors such as the Troika. In a similar manner, the management of the so-called refugee crisis relied on international humanitarian organisations rather than national authorities, particularly during the Syriza years, when Greece was politically constructed as an outlier—or “black sheep”—within the EU. Migration funding thus functioned not merely as a technical instrument or emergency solution, but as a mechanism of crisis governance that articulated political relations between the EU and Greece at the time. It sidelined national institutions, reinforcing an externally administered humanitarian regime that further diminished the role of the state.

This allocation pattern shifted markedly in 2020 and 2021, following the election of Nea Dimokratia, a right-wing conservative government closely aligned with EU institutions. During this period, nearly
half of all EU emergency funding (approximately 48%) was channelled directly to the Greek Ministry of Migration, amounting to €523 million. International organisations continued to play a significant role, with
around 31% of funds allocated to the IOM and
21% to UNHCR, yet their dominance over funding flows was substantially reduced compared to the previous period. Notably, no funding was directed to other INGOs or Greek authorities outside the Ministry of Migration.

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2020-2021

This allocation pattern shifted markedly in 2020 and 2021, following the election of Nea Dimokratia, a right-wing conservative government closely aligned with EU institutions. During this period, nearly half of all EU emergency funding (approximately 48%) was channelled directly to the Greek Ministry of Migration, amounting to €523 million. International organisations continued to play a significant role, with around 31% of funds allocated to the IOM and 21% to UNHCR, yet their dominance over funding flows was substantially reduced compared to the previous period. Notably, no funding was directed to other INGOs or Greek authorities outside the Ministry of Migration.
This reconfiguration of funding priorities signals a clear departure from the humanitarian governance model that prevailed between 2016 and 2019. More importantly, it illustrates how EU emergency funding mechanisms are deeply entangled with domestic political configurations and a government’s relationship with European institutions. Rather than reflecting a neutral or purely technical assessment of capacity, the redistribution of funds following the change in government suggests that trust, political alignment, and perceptions of state legitimacy play a decisive role in determining who governs migration in practice. In this sense, funding flows reveal—more clearly than formal policy statements—the political logics underpinning EU crisis governance.

This diagram brings together the two distinct phases of EU emergency funding for migration governance in Greece between 2016 and 2021.

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2016-2021

This diagram brings together the two distinct phases of EU emergency funding for migration governance in Greece between 2016 and 2021. In the first phase (2016–2019), funding was overwhelmingly channelled to international organisations—primarily UN agencies and INGOs—reflecting a humanitarian governance model that largely bypassed Greek state institutions. Following the 2019 political transition, a second phase emerges in which funding was substantially reoriented toward the Greek Ministry of Migration, signalling a shift toward state-centred governance.
Read together, the two phases highlight how EU emergency funding mechanisms are not merely technical responses to migration pressures, but politically contingent instruments that reflect shifting assessments of state capacity, trust, and political alignment between national governments and EU institutions.